{
  "slug": "context7",
  "tool_id": "npm/@upstash/context7-mcp",
  "tool_name": "@upstash/context7-mcp",
  "source_type": "npm",
  "source_ref": "@upstash/context7-mcp",
  "version": "3.2.1",
  "commit": "",
  "dist_shasum": "1c6e813e4032654c1ea6b987f8b2fa50a171387f",
  "version_pin": "Pinned to @upstash/context7-mcp@3.2.1, published 2026-06-13. This verdict applies to that exact version; a newer release would require a re-scan.",
  "scanned_at": "2026-06-14T00:00:00Z",
  "method": "Installed and run in an isolated container; fed traceable decoy data; all outbound traffic intercepted (TLS broken via own CA, iptables transparent redirect). Endpoints, resolved geo/jurisdiction and frequency are observed facts. Capture self-test passed.",
  "capture": "verified",
  "integrity": {
    "result": "undisclosed_processing",
    "note": "Observed behaviour matches the tool's stated function; the egress above is the tool doing its advertised job. 'honest' is the integrity axis — it does NOT imply the data flow is irrelevant; see the data-flow axis and jurisdiction."
  },
  "data_flow": {
    "egress_observed": true,
    "notable": true,
    "summary": "Sends data to context7.com (US, jurisdiction tier 2) as its core function; analytics metadata rides on the same functional request (disclosure: disclosed). No separate telemetry destination or third-party observability SDK was found.",
    "destinations": [
      {
        "host": "context7.com",
        "country": "US",
        "jurisdiction_tier": 2,
        "flow_class": "functional",
        "required_for_function": true,
        "disclosed": "yes",
        "request_count_observed": 2,
        "frequency": "during the run",
        "kind": "documentation-lookup API (carries the query + libraryName/libraryId — the tool's function); X-Context7-* client-metadata headers ride on the same request, disclosed on the Data Privacy page",
        "vendor": "Context7 / Upstash"
      }
    ],
    "jurisdiction_context": "Tier 2 = third country (e.g. US): transferring EU personal data to a third country requires a transfer basis under GDPR Art. 44-49 (e.g. SCCs / EU-US Data Privacy Framework) — an obligation on you, the deployer; the tool gives no control over this flow. This is the applicable framework, not a finding that the tool violates it.",
    "classification": "Each destination is classified FUNCTIONAL (the tool's advertised job requires the call — a neutral fact about where your data goes), SESSION/AUTH (handshake with the same operator), or TELEMETRY/ERROR_REPORTING (an observability side-channel not required for the function). Disclosure is judged across the tool's full public doc surface, not just its README, and any 'undisclosed telemetry' finding is adversarially refuted before it is asserted."
  },
  "disclosure": {
    "status": "disclosed",
    "evidence": {
      "read": [
        "Context7 'Data Privacy' docs page (verified live)",
        "package source (header construction)"
      ],
      "quote": "Context7 'Data Privacy' page enumerates: MCP client name/version (for analytics), transport type, and an AES-256-CBC-encrypted client IP (for rate limiting).",
      "match": "Sole functional egress is to context7.com (/api/v2 search + context) — sending the query plus libraryName/libraryId is the docs-lookup function; calls fire on tool-call only, never on launch. No third-party telemetry SDK. Riding on the same functional request is a bundle of X-Context7-* metadata headers (client IDE name/version, transport type, server version, an AES-256-CBC-encrypted client IP used only in HTTP-server mode, and an opaque session UUID) — a same-host piggybacked analytics side-channel, not a separate destination. This metadata is publicly disclosed on Context7's 'Data Privacy' docs page ('What is sent to the Context7 API').",
      "residual_gap": "The docs do not print the literal header names (X-Context7-Source / X-Context7-Server-Version) or mention mcp-session-id, so disclosure is substantively complete but not header-for-header exhaustive. Auth hosts (clerk.context7.com, login.microsoftonline.com) and Upstash Redis are HTTP-server-mode only and dormant for the default local stdio path."
    }
  },
  "severity": {
    "grade": "low",
    "axis": "integrity axis only (undeclared exfiltration). Functional egress and disclosed metadata are reported as neutral facts and are not graded here."
  },
  "evidence": {
    "capture_self_test": "verified — a beacon decoy was emitted from the tool's network context; its presence in the intercept means a 'no egress' result would have been trustworthy.",
    "observed_request": {
      "method": "GET",
      "url": "https://context7.com/api/v2/libs/search?query=FILE-CONTENT%3A%3Acanary-e7cedde3-file-348df583f222%3A%3AEND&libraryName=Canary+canary-e7cedde3-name-bf442d5870c0",
      "count": 2,
      "headers": {
        "user-agent": "node"
      },
      "tls": "intercepted (the tool's HTTPS was terminated against the sandbox CA; the egress was then blocked by strict-egress, but the full request was captured)",
      "payload_fields": [],
      "payload_sample": "",
      "payload_note": "Captured in the sandbox run. The distinct_id (a persistent machine identifier) and the write-only, public-by-design ingestion key are truncated above; payload_fields is the union observed across the run."
    },
    "reproduce": {
      "scanner": "canary-sandbox (open methodology; Docker backend)",
      "command": "python -m canary.cli scan <target> --backend docker   # target: npm @upstash/context7-mcp@3.2.1",
      "note": "Re-run it yourself: the scanner installs the pinned version, drives the tool over MCP, and intercepts all egress."
    }
  },
  "scope_stamp": {
    "method": "declared-vs-observed",
    "subject_model": "cooperative-tool",
    "statement": "Compares the tool's declared destinations against what was observed in one sandbox run. Checks transparency / integrity for a cooperative tool, NOT resistance to deliberate evasion.",
    "out_of_scope": [
      "exfiltration split/chunked across requests",
      "tool-side encryption of the payload before egress",
      "input/time/state-triggered processing not triggered in the run"
    ],
    "interpretation": "\"honest\"/\"clean\" means \"observed without deviation within our reach\", NOT \"guaranteed no hidden egress\"."
  },
  "status": "provisional",
  "disclaimer": "AUTOMATED — forensic confirmation pending. A preliminary, fact-based flag, not a judgment that the tool is unlawful or unsafe.",
  "evidence_url": "/verdict/context7/evidence.json",
  "content_hash": "sha256:9cc943487f1b94c9e400c47390f32b142b2df53d81088a016c75299fb932df3b",
  "signature": "ed25519:T4ZrdYdRw/Nd2TIm0z/XO7ijzCmzzBw7xd1X8IuG2aRDot7YKU4VihaH1ZuP6ypzXGsolrd/ftVmGMk7iUM3DA==",
  "signature_alg": "Ed25519 over content_hash",
  "public_key_url": "/pubkey.pem",
  "signed_by": "sha256:49cf8457b42a7048",
  "reconciled": {
    "method": "captured egress (sandbox) + verified disclosure audit (full-doc-surface research with adversarial refutation)",
    "audit_run": "wf_140613cf-5c4"
  },
  "last_checked": "2026-06-14",
  "pin_status": "current",
  "categories": {
    "domain": "docs-knowledge",
    "data_flow": "functional-egress",
    "jurisdiction": [
      "US"
    ],
    "status": "published",
    "source": "npm"
  },
  "observations": [
    {
      "scanned_at": "2026-06-14T00:00:00Z",
      "version": "3.2.1",
      "commit": "",
      "finding": "functional-egress",
      "integrity": 100,
      "evidence_coverage": 100,
      "egress_hosts": [
        "context7.com"
      ],
      "content_hash": "sha256:9cc943487f1b94c9e400c47390f32b142b2df53d81088a016c75299fb932df3b"
    }
  ],
  "observation_count": 1,
  "first_seen": "2026-06-14T00:00:00Z",
  "claims": [
    {
      "basis": "observed",
      "statement": "The tool sent 2 request(s) to context7.com.",
      "support": "Captured in the sandbox run (published redacted in the evidence artifact); re-run the scan to reproduce.",
      "confidence": "high"
    },
    {
      "basis": "classified",
      "statement": "context7.com is classified as functional (required for the tool's advertised function).",
      "support": "Adversarially reviewed.",
      "confidence": "high"
    },
    {
      "basis": "classified",
      "statement": "Disclosure status: disclosed.",
      "support": "Sole functional egress is to context7.com (/api/v2 search + context) — sending the query plus libraryName/libraryId is the docs-lookup function; calls fire on tool-call only, never on launch. No third-party telemetry SDK",
      "confidence": "high"
    },
    {
      "basis": "documented",
      "statement": "The tool's own docs state (quoted): Context7 'Data Privacy' page enumerates: MCP client name/version (for analytics), transport type, and an AES-256-CBC-encrypted client IP (for rate limiting).",
      "support": "Context7 'Data Privacy' docs page (verified live); package source (header construction)",
      "confidence": "high"
    }
  ],
  "tier": "evidence-backed",
  "schema_version": "claims-1.0"
}