Does @forestadmin/mcp-server send data, and where? — data-flow verdict
provisional · AUTOMATED — forensic confirmation pending. A preliminary, fact-based flag, not a judgment that the tool is unlawful or unsafe.
100/100 integrity
100% evidence coverage
evidence-backed
Measures evidence support, not confidence — how this is scored
Verdict (the facts)
- Tool
- npm/@forestadmin/mcp-server
- Integrity axis
- honest — Observed behaviour matches the tool's stated function; the egress above is the tool doing its advertised job. 'honest' is the integrity axis — it does NOT imply the data flow is irrelevant; see the data-flow axis and jurisdiction.
- Data-flow axis
- Sends data to api.forestadmin.com (FR, jurisdiction tier 0) as its core function. No telemetry, analytics or error-reporting side-channel was found (full source + dependency-tree review). Where your data goes is determined by the tool's stated purpose, not by a hidden observability channel.
- Disclosure
- functional — NO telemetry/usage-analytics/error-reporting flow. All egress is functional/auth to a single first-party host, api.forestadmin.com (Forest Admin SAS, France/EU). The 2 captured launch requests, GET /liana/forest-schema (collection/field schema) and GET /liana/environment (OAuth init), both carry the configured Forest secret — functional setup for the admin-over-DB tool.
- Capture self-test
- verified
- Severity
- none — integrity axis only (undeclared exfiltration). Functional egress and disclosed metadata are reported as neutral facts and are not graded here.
- Version (pinned)
- 1.12.3 · commit b31132cbccf27742a3d3bb94be3fa58cae77651f
- Content hash
- sha256:3eb20c7747b818740abd9a2e48be2868c5d18f140f3c0e71953636913d05bdfb
- Signature
- ed25519:ZLRY7WuvTxP0lnayIYV/CPwnwNnKOWIgU/dSGh… · Ed25519 public key · sha256:49cf8457b42a7048
- Scanned
- 2026-06-14T00:00:00Z — Pinned to @forestadmin/mcp-server@1.12.3 (git b31132cbccf27742a3d3bb94be3fa58cae77651f), published 2026-06-11. This verdict applies to that exact version; a newer release would require a re-scan.
- Re-verified
- 2026-06-14 — pinned version current
- Categories
- other functional-egress FR published
- Observation history
- 1 scan(s); first seen 2026-06-14T00:00:00Z · latest 2026-06-14T00:00:00Z
Observed egress destinations
| host | country | jurisdiction | class | disclosure | frequency | kind |
| api.forestadmin.com | FR | tier 0 | functional | by purpose | during the run | Forest Admin first-party API — schema + OAuth init for the admin-over-DB tool (the function); carries the configured Forest secret |
Each destination is classified FUNCTIONAL (the tool's advertised job requires the call — a neutral fact about where your data goes), SESSION/AUTH (handshake with the same operator), or TELEMETRY/ERROR_REPORTING (an observability side-channel not required for the function). Disclosure is judged across the tool's full public doc surface, not just its README, and any 'undisclosed telemetry' finding is adversarially refuted before it is asserted.
Jurisdiction context:
Evidence — the captured request (verify, don't just trust)
Capture self-test: verified — a beacon decoy was emitted from the tool's network context; its presence in the intercept means a 'no egress' result would have been trustworthy.
Observed: GET
https://api.forestadmin.com/liana/forest-schema ×2
— intercepted (the tool's HTTPS was terminated against the sandbox CA; the egress was then blocked by strict-egress, but the full request was captured)
Payload fields actually sent:
Captured payload sample (one event):
Captured in the sandbox run. The distinct_id (a persistent machine identifier) and the write-only, public-by-design ingestion key are truncated above; payload_fields is the union observed across the run.
Reproduce it yourself (canary-sandbox (open methodology; Docker backend)):
python -m canary.cli scan <target> --backend docker # target: npm @forestadmin/mcp-server@1.12.3
Re-run it yourself: the scanner installs the pinned version, drives the tool over MCP, and intercepts all egress.
Full raw captured trace + verification:
/verdict/forestadmin/evidence.json
— every captured request (redacted), the verdict content-hash and the package checksum, for an AI or auditor that wants the underlying observation, not just the conclusion.
Disclosure check (the §824 evidence)
- Read
- package source (single first-party host); README + CHANGELOG; telemetry grep (none)
- Quoted from the tool's own docs
- “”
- Match
- NO telemetry/usage-analytics/error-reporting flow. All egress is functional/auth to a single first-party host, api.forestadmin.com (Forest Admin SAS, France/EU). The 2 captured launch requests, GET /liana/forest-schema (collection/field schema) and GET /liana/environment (OAuth init), both carry the configured Forest secret — functional setup for the admin-over-DB tool.
- Residual gap
- Forest Admin writes an activity-log/audit entry server-side (documented in CHANGELOG) — disclosed:partial, an inherent audit feature, not a third-party telemetry beacon. Jurisdiction: api.forestadmin.com is EU (France) — tier 0, no third-country transfer concern for EU data.
How we know this — claims by basis
A verdict is a reproducible evidence container, not just a claim. Each assertion is tagged: an observation is in the capture and reproducible; an inference is our reasoning over it; documented is the tool’s own statement; a classification is our adversarially-reviewed judgment. Observation never reads as inference.
Observed — directly in the capture, reproducible
- The tool sent 2 request(s) to api.forestadmin.com. — Captured in the sandbox run (published redacted in the evidence artifact); re-run the scan to reproduce. (confidence: high)
Documented — the tool's own statement
- The tool's own docs state (quoted): iew This MCP server provides HTTP REST API access to Forest Admin operations, enabling AI assistants and other MCP clients to interact with your Forest Admin data through a standardized protocol. ## — npm registry readme for @forestadmin/mcp-server (confidence: high)
Classified — our adversarially-reviewed judgment
- api.forestadmin.com is classified as egress (an observability side-channel, not required for the function). — Adversarially reviewed. (confidence: high)
- Disclosure status: disclosed. — The observed endpoint api.forestadmin.com is named/disclosed in the tool's own docs (matched: api). (confidence: high)
Method
Installed and run in an isolated container; fed traceable decoy data; all outbound traffic intercepted (TLS broken via own CA, iptables transparent redirect). Endpoints, resolved geo/jurisdiction and frequency are observed facts. Capture self-test passed.
Scope
Compares the tool's declared destinations against what was observed in one sandbox run. Checks transparency / integrity for a cooperative tool, NOT resistance to deliberate evasion. "honest"/"clean" means "observed without deviation within our reach", NOT "guaranteed no hidden egress".
Out of scope: exfiltration split/chunked across requests; tool-side encryption of the payload before egress; input/time/state-triggered processing not triggered in the run.
Machine-readable verdict: /verdict/forestadmin.json.
This page describes observed behaviour and its relation to the tool's own disclosures — it is not a legal judgment.
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