{ "slug": "gitlab", "tool_id": "npm/@yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server", "tool_name": "@yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server", "source_type": "npm", "source_ref": "@yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server", "version": "0.9.1", "commit": "177adc871ef94c39902bcdb8c89200d000e02e64", "dist_shasum": "54f88e5b8831d32bd9faa3257d352619649072ab", "version_pin": "Pinned to @yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server@0.9.1 (git 177adc871ef94c39902bcdb8c89200d000e02e64), published 2026-05-27. This verdict applies to that exact version; a newer release would require a re-scan.", "scanned_at": "2026-06-14T00:00:00Z", "method": "Installed and run in an isolated container; fed traceable decoy data; all outbound traffic intercepted (TLS broken via own CA, iptables transparent redirect). Endpoints, resolved geo/jurisdiction and frequency are observed facts. Capture self-test passed.", "capture": "verified", "integrity": { "result": "undisclosed_processing", "note": "Observed behaviour matches the tool's stated function; the egress above is the tool doing its advertised job. 'honest' is the integrity axis — it does NOT imply the data flow is irrelevant; see the data-flow axis and jurisdiction." }, "data_flow": { "egress_observed": true, "notable": true, "summary": "Sends data to gitlab.com (US, jurisdiction tier 2) as its core function. No telemetry, analytics or error-reporting side-channel was found (full source + dependency-tree review). Where your data goes is determined by the tool's stated purpose, not by a hidden observability channel.", "destinations": [ { "host": "gitlab.com", "country": "US", "jurisdiction_tier": 2, "flow_class": "functional", "required_for_function": true, "disclosed": "by_purpose", "request_count_observed": 32, "frequency": "on launch and on every tool call", "kind": "GitLab REST API (/api/v4) — writes agent-supplied data into GitLab; carries the user's token (the tool's function)", "vendor": "GitLab Inc. (US; configurable)" } ], "jurisdiction_context": "Tier 2 = third country (e.g. US): transferring EU personal data to a third country requires a transfer basis under GDPR Art. 44-49 (e.g. SCCs / EU-US Data Privacy Framework) — an obligation on you, the deployer; the tool gives no control over this flow. This is the applicable framework, not a finding that the tool violates it.", "classification": "Each destination is classified FUNCTIONAL (the tool's advertised job requires the call — a neutral fact about where your data goes), SESSION/AUTH (handshake with the same operator), or TELEMETRY/ERROR_REPORTING (an observability side-channel not required for the function). Disclosure is judged across the tool's full public doc surface, not just its README, and any 'undisclosed telemetry' finding is adversarially refuted before it is asserted." }, "disclosure": { "status": "functional", "evidence": { "read": [ "README + SECURITY.md + CHANGELOG", "full source (src/index.ts, gitlab-api.ts — single egress base)", "dependency tree (no telemetry SDK)", "captured requests (32, all gitlab.com)" ], "quote": "", "match": "Functional-only: all 32 captured requests go to gitlab.com under /api/v4/* (projects, repository files, merge_requests, pipelines, branches, tags, releases, members), each carrying the user's GITLAB_TOKEN — the GitLab REST API the tool wraps. Full source read: GITLAB_API_URL is the sole egress base (operator-configurable to a self-hosted instance); no telemetry/analytics SDK in deps; CHANGELOG/SECURITY.md confirm no other outbound target.", "residual_gap": "Default gitlab.com = US (GitLab Inc.); GITLAB_API_URL is operator-configurable to a self-hosted/EU instance. SECURITY.md notes the configurable URL as an SSRF surface (operator's responsibility)." } }, "severity": { "grade": "low", "axis": "integrity axis only (undeclared exfiltration). Functional egress and disclosed metadata are reported as neutral facts and are not graded here." }, "evidence": { "capture_self_test": "verified — a beacon decoy was emitted from the tool's network context; its presence in the intercept means a 'no egress' result would have been trustworthy.", "observed_request": { "method": "GET", "url": "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/FILE-CONTENT%3A%3Acanary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5%3A%3AEND/repository/files/FILE-CONTENT%3A%3Acanary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5%3A%3AEND?ref=FILE-CONTENT%3A%3Acanary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5%3A%3AEND", "count": 32, "headers": { "user-agent": "node-fetch" }, "tls": "intercepted (the tool's HTTPS was terminated against the sandbox CA; the egress was then blocked by strict-egress, but the full request was captured)", "payload_fields": [ "branch", "content", "commit_message", "previous_path", "title", "description", "source_branch", "target_branch", "ref", "tag_name", "message", "release_description", "name", "milestones", "released_at", "color", "due_date", "start_date" ], "payload_sample": "{\"tag_name\":\"Canary canary-e0448706-name-f1093cf0ee99\",\"name\":\"Canary canary-e0448706-name-f1093cf0ee99\",\"description\":\"FILE-CONTENT::canary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5::END\",\"ref\":\"FILE-CONTENT::canary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5::END\",\"milestones\":[\"canary-e0448706-email-56354990ed25@trace.invalid\"],\"released_at\":\"FILE-CONTENT::canary-e0448706-file-18366ed610a5::END\"}", "payload_note": "Captured in the sandbox run. The distinct_id (a persistent machine identifier) and the write-only, public-by-design ingestion key are truncated above; payload_fields is the union observed across the run." }, "reproduce": { "scanner": "canary-sandbox (open methodology; Docker backend)", "command": "python -m canary.cli scan --backend docker # target: npm @yoda.digital/gitlab-mcp-server@0.9.1", "note": "Re-run it yourself: the scanner installs the pinned version, drives the tool over MCP, and intercepts all egress." } }, "scope_stamp": { "method": "declared-vs-observed", "subject_model": "cooperative-tool", "statement": "Compares the tool's declared destinations against what was observed in one sandbox run. Checks transparency / integrity for a cooperative tool, NOT resistance to deliberate evasion.", "out_of_scope": [ "exfiltration split/chunked across requests", "tool-side encryption of the payload before egress", "input/time/state-triggered processing not triggered in the run" ], "interpretation": "\"honest\"/\"clean\" means \"observed without deviation within our reach\", NOT \"guaranteed no hidden egress\"." }, "status": "provisional", "disclaimer": "AUTOMATED — forensic confirmation pending. A preliminary, fact-based flag, not a judgment that the tool is unlawful or unsafe.", "evidence_url": "/verdict/gitlab/evidence.json", "categories": { "domain": "cloud-devops", "data_flow": "functional-egress", "jurisdiction": [ "US" ], "status": "published", "source": "npm" }, "claims": [ { "basis": "observed", "statement": "The tool sent 32 request(s) to gitlab.com carrying fields: branch, content, commit_message, previous_path, title, description, source_branch, target_branch, ref, tag_name, message, release_description.", "support": "Captured in the sandbox run (published redacted in the evidence artifact); re-run the scan to reproduce.", "confidence": "high" }, { "basis": "classified", "statement": "gitlab.com is classified as egress (an observability side-channel, not required for the function).", "support": "Adversarially reviewed.", "confidence": "high" }, { "basis": "inferred", "statement": "The repeated requests suggest the flow fires on launch and on each tool call.", "support": "32 requests in one run — an inferred pattern, not proven across launches.", "confidence": "medium" }, { "basis": "classified", "statement": "Disclosure status: disclosed.", "support": "The observed endpoint gitlab.com is named/disclosed in the tool's own docs (matched: gitlab).", "confidence": "high" }, { "basis": "documented", "statement": "The tool's own docs state (quoted): # GitLab MCP Server

\"GitLab